Skip to content

THE ROLE OF FAMILY TIES IN AGENCY CONTRACTS.

Luis R. Gómez‐Mejía, Manuel Núñez Nickel, Isabel Gutiérrez

Academy of Management Journal · 2001 · 1,378 citationsOpen access

No retraction on record in OpenAlex.Check Crossref now

Cite this paper

Gómez‐Mejía, L. R., Nickel, M. N., & Gutiérrez, I. (2001). THE ROLE OF FAMILY TIES IN AGENCY CONTRACTS. Academy of Management Journal, 44(1), 81–95. https://doi.org/10.5465/3069338

In text: (Gómez‐Mejía et al., 2001)

Ask a question about this research

One question, free, no account. Anchorcite finds the papers, checks each against Crossref and links every sentence of the answer to the passage it comes from.

Abstract

Drawing on data based on the entire population of Spanish newspapers over 27 years (1966-93), this study shows that firm performance and business risk are much stronger predictors of chief executive tenure when a firm's owners and its executive have family ties and that the organizational consequences of CEO dismissal are more favorable when the replaced CEO is a member of the family owning the firm. The study also demonstrates that executives operating under weakly relational (less ambiguous) contracts are held more accountable for firm performance and business risk outcomes, even under nonfamily contracting.

  1. The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities1973
  2. Law and Finance1998
  3. The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns1992
  4. Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers1984
  5. On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance1997

Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0). Citations are generated from the published record.