Law and Finance
Florencio López‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Journal of Political Economy · 1998 · 18,393 citations
Abstract
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common‐law countries generally have the strongest, and frenchcivillaw countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German‐and scandinavin‐civil‐law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negativelyrelated to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified share‐holders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
Cite this paper
Porta, R. L., López‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113–1155. https://doi.org/10.1086/250042
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