Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt
Journal of Political Economy · 1991 · 3,227 citationsOpen access
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Cite this paper
Diamond, D. W. (1991). Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt. Journal of Political Economy, 99(4), 689–721. https://doi.org/10.1086/261775
In text: (Diamond, 1991)
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Abstract
This paper determines when a debt contract will be monitored by lenders. This is the choice between borrowing directly (issuing a bond, without monitoring) and borrowing through a bank that monitors to alleviate moral hazard. This provides a theory of bank loan demand and of the role of monitoring in circumstances in which reputation effects are important. A key result is that borrowers with credit ratings toward the middle of the spectrum rely on bank loans, and in periods of high interest rates or low future profitability, higher-rated borrowers choose to borrow from banks.
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