Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?
Randall Mørck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
The Journal of Finance · 1990 · 2,142 citationsOpen access
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Mørck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1990). Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions? The Journal of Finance, 45(1), 31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05079.x
In text: (Mørck et al., 1990)
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Abstract
ABSTRACT In a sample of 326 US acquisitions between 1975 and 1987, three types of acquisitions have systematically lower and predominantly negative announcement period returns to bidding firms. The returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies, when it buys a rapidly growing target, and when its managers performed poorly before the acquisition. These results suggest that managerial objectives may drive acquisitions that reduce bidding firms' values.
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