Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
Douglas W. Diamond, Robert E. Verrecchia
The Journal of Finance · 1991 · 3,864 citations
No retraction on record in OpenAlex.Check Crossref now
Cite this paper
Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1991). Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. The Journal of Finance, 46(4), 1325. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x
In text: (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991)
Ask a question about this research
One question, free, no account. Anchorcite finds the papers, checks each against Crossref and links every sentence of the answer to the passage it comes from.
Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper shows that revealing public information to reduce information asymmetry can reduce a firm's cost of capital by attracting increased demand from large investors due to increased liquidity of its securities. Large firms will disclose more information since they benefit most. Disclosure also reduces the risk bearing capacity available through market makers. If initial information asymmetry is large, reducing it will increase the current price of the security. However, the maximum current price occurs with some asymmetry of information: further reduction of information asymmetry accentuates the undesirable effects of exit from market making.
Related papers
Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0). Citations are generated from the published record.