Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang, Fei Xie
The Journal of Finance · 2007 · 1,853 citationsOpen access
No retraction on record in OpenAlex.Check Crossref now
Cite this paper
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2007). Corporate governance and acquirer returns. The Journal of Finance, 62(4), 1851–1889. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x
In text: (Masulis et al., 2007)
Ask a question about this research
One question, free, no account. Anchorcite finds the papers, checks each against Crossref and links every sentence of the answer to the passage it comes from.
Abstract
ABSTRACT We examine whether corporate governance mechanisms, especially the market for corporate control, affect the profitability of firm acquisitions. We find that acquirers with more antitakeover provisions experience significantly lower announcement‐period abnormal stock returns. This supports the hypothesis that managers at firms protected by more antitakeover provisions are less subject to the disciplinary power of the market for corporate control and thus are more likely to indulge in empire‐building acquisitions that destroy shareholder value. We also find that acquirers operating in more competitive industries or separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board experience higher abnormal announcement returns.
Related papers
Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0). Citations are generated from the published record.