CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
Ulrike M. Malmendier, Geoffrey A. Tate
The Journal of Finance · 2005 · 3,806 citationsOpen access
No retraction on record in OpenAlex.Check Crossref now
Cite this paper
Malmendier, U. M., & Tate, G. A. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. The Journal of Finance, 60(6), 2661–2700. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x
In text: (Malmendier & Tate, 2005)
Ask a question about this research
One question, free, no account. Anchorcite finds the papers, checks each against Crossref and links every sentence of the answer to the passage it comes from.
Abstract
ABSTRACT We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company‐specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity‐dependent firms.
Related papers
Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0). Citations are generated from the published record.