Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?
David A. Hirshleifer, Angie Low, Siew Hong Teoh
The Journal of Finance · 2012 · 1,813 citations
No retraction on record in OpenAlex.Check Crossref now
Cite this paper
Hirshleifer, D. A., Low, A., & Teoh, S. H. (2012). Are overconfident CEOs better innovators? The Journal of Finance, 67(4), 1457–1498. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01753.x
In text: (Hirshleifer et al., 2012)
Ask a question about this research
One question, free, no account. Anchorcite finds the papers, checks each against Crossref and links every sentence of the answer to the passage it comes from.
Abstract
ABSTRACT Previous empirical work on adverse consequences of CEO overconfidence raises the question of why firms hire overconfident managers. Theoretical research suggests a reason: overconfidence can benefit shareholders by increasing investment in risky projects. Using options‐ and press‐based proxies for CEO overconfidence, we find that over the 1993–2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development expenditures. However, overconfident managers achieve greater innovation only in innovative industries. Our findings suggest that overconfidence helps CEOs exploit innovative growth opportunities.
Related papers
Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0). Citations are generated from the published record.