The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Benjamin Klein, Keith B. Leffler
Journal of Political Economy · 1981 · 3,610 citations
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Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981). The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance. Journal of Political Economy, 89(4), 615–641. https://doi.org/10.1086/260996
In text: (Klein & Leffler, 1981)
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Abstract
The conditions under which transactors can use the market (repeat-purchase) mechanism of contract enforcement are examined. Increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance. A necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance. This will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm-specific assets. Advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance.
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