Skip to content

Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem

Roger B. Myerson

Econometrica · 1979 · 1,960 citations

No retraction on record in OpenAlex.Check Crossref now

Cite this paper

Myerson, R. B. (1979). Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica, 47(1), 61. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912346

In text: (Myerson, 1979)

Ask a question about this research

One question, free, no account. Anchorcite finds the papers, checks each against Crossref and links every sentence of the answer to the passage it comes from.

Abstract

Collective choice problems are studied from the Bayesian viewpoint. It is shown that the set of expected utility allocations which are feasible with incentive-compatible mechanisms is compact and convex, and includes the equilibrium allocations for all other mechanisms. The generalized Nash solution proposed by Harsanyi and Selten is then applied to this set to define a bargaining solution for Bayesian collective choice problems.

  1. Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets2003
  2. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance1981
  3. Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations1983
  4. Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic Marketplaces1997
  5. Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation1988

Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0). Citations are generated from the published record.