The Categorical Imperative: Securities Analysts and the Illegitimacy Discount
American Journal of Sociology · 1999 · 2,187 citations
No retraction on record in OpenAlex.Check Crossref now
Cite this paper
Zuckerman, E. W. (1999). The categorical imperative: Securities analysts and the illegitimacy discount. American Journal of Sociology, 104(5), 1398–1438. https://doi.org/10.1086/210178
In text: (Zuckerman, 1999)
Ask a question about this research
One question, free, no account. Anchorcite finds the papers, checks each against Crossref and links every sentence of the answer to the passage it comes from.
Abstract
This article explores the social processes that produce penalties for illegitimate role performance. It is proposed that such penalties are illuminated in markets that are significantly mediated by product critics. In particular, it is argued that failure to gain reviews by the critics who specialize in a product's intended category reflects confusion over the product's identity and that such illegitimacy should depress demand. The validity of this assertion is tested among public American firms in the stock market over the years 1985–94. It is shown that the stock price of an American firm was discounted to the extent that the firm was not covered by the securities analysts who specialized in its industries. This analysis holds implications for the study of role conformity in both market and nonmarket settings and adds sociological insight to the recent “behavioral” critique of the prevailing “efficient‐market” perspective on capital markets.
Related papers
- CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*1964
- The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns1992
- On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance1997
- Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests1973
- Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency1993
Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0). Citations are generated from the published record.