Skip to content

Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

Roland Bénabou, Jean Tirole Z

American Economic Review · 2006 · 3,461 citationsOpen access

No retraction on record in OpenAlex.Check Crossref now

Cite this paper

Bénabou, R., & Z, J. T. (2006). Incentives and prosocial behavior. American Economic Review, 96(5), 1652–1678. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.5.1652

In text: (Bénabou & Z, 2006)

Ask a question about this research

One question, free, no account. Anchorcite finds the papers, checks each against Crossref and links every sentence of the answer to the passage it comes from.

Abstract

We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this “overjustification effect” can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and, more generally, those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.

  1. The weirdest people in the world?2010
  2. An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict2000
  3. A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation1999
  4. Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.1970
  5. The Bargaining Problem1950

Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0). Citations are generated from the published record.