An Evolutionary Approach to Norms
American Political Science Review · 1986 · 2,224 citations
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Cite this paper
Axelrod, R. (1986). An evolutionary approach to norms. American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1095–1111. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055400185016
In text: (Axelrod, 1986)
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Abstract
Norms provide a powerful mechanism for regulating conflict in groups, even when there are more than two people and no central authority. This paper investigates the emergence and stability of behavioral norms in the context of a game played by people of limited rationality. The dynamics of this new norms game are analyzed with a computer simulation based upon the evolutionary principle that strategies shown to be relatively effective will be used more in the future than less effective strategies. The results show the conditions under which norms can evolve and prove stable. One interesting possibility is the employment ofmetanorms,the willingness to punish someone who did not enforce a norm. Many historical examples of domestic and international norms are used to illustrate the wide variety of mechanisms that can support norms, including metanorms, dominance, internalization, deterrence, social proof, membership in groups, law, and reputation.
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