Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
Daron Acemoğlu, James A. Robinson
The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2000 · 1,985 citationsOpen access
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Acemoğlu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2000). Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), 1167–1199. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300555042
In text: (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2000)
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Abstract
During the nineteenth century most Western societies extended voting rights, a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs. We argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution. Political transition, rather than redistribution under existing political institutions, occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers, while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution. Our theory also offers a novel explanation for the Kuznets curve in many Western economies during this period, with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization.
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