The Politics of Blame Avoidance
Journal of Public Policy · 1986 · 2,247 citations
No retraction on record in OpenAlex.Check Crossref now
Cite this paper
Weaver, R. K. (1986). The politics of blame avoidance. Journal of Public Policy, 6(4), 371–398. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x00004219
In text: (Weaver, 1986)
Ask a question about this research
One question, free, no account. Anchorcite finds the papers, checks each against Crossref and links every sentence of the answer to the passage it comes from.
Abstract
ABSTRACT Politicians are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid blame for unpopular actions rather than by seeking to claim credit for popular ones. This results from voters' ‘negativity bias’: their tendency to be more sensitive to real or potential losses than they are to gains. Incentives to avoid blame lead politicians to adopt a distinctive set of political strategies, including agenda limitation, scapegoating, ‘passing the buck’ and defection (‘jumping on the bandwagon’) that are different than those they would follow if they were primarily interested in pursuing good policy or maximizing credit-claiming opportunities. These strategies in turn lead to important policy effects, including a surrender of discretion even when it offers important credit-claiming opportunities.
Related papers
Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0). Citations are generated from the published record.