The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1985 · 3,701 citations
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Cite this paper
Rogoff, K. (1985). The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100(4), 1169. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885679
In text: (Rogoff, 1985)
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Abstract
Society can sometimes make itself better off by appointing a central banker who does not share the social objective function, but instead places “too large” a weight on inflation-rate stabilization relative to employment stabilization. Although having such an agent head the central bank reduces the time-consistent rate of inflation, it suboptimally raises the variance of employment when supply shocks are large. Using an envelope theorem, we show that the ideal agent places a large, but finite, weight on inflation. The analysis also provides a new framework for choosing among alternative intermediate monetary targets.
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