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Rents, Competition, and Corruption

Alberto F. Ades, Rafael Di Tella

American Economic Review · 1999 · 1,766 citationsOpen access

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Ades, A. F., & Tella, R. D. (1999). Rents, competition, and corruption. American Economic Review, 89(4), 982–993. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.4.982

In text: (Ades & Tella, 1999)

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Abstract

Theoretically the effect of competition on corruption is ambiguous. Less competition means firms enjoy higher rents, so that bureaucrats with control rights over them, such as tax inspectors or regulators, have higher incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior. Examples of a positive connection between rents and corruption abound, however. The hypothesis that natural rents, as in the case of oil, and rents induced by lack of product market competition foster corruption, is examined. A model is set up connecting rents to corruption.

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