Rents, Competition, and Corruption
Alberto F. Ades, Rafael Di Tella
American Economic Review · 1999 · 1,766 citationsOpen access
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Cite this paper
Ades, A. F., & Tella, R. D. (1999). Rents, competition, and corruption. American Economic Review, 89(4), 982–993. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.4.982
In text: (Ades & Tella, 1999)
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Abstract
Theoretically the effect of competition on corruption is ambiguous. Less competition means firms enjoy higher rents, so that bureaucrats with control rights over them, such as tax inspectors or regulators, have higher incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior. Examples of a positive connection between rents and corruption abound, however. The hypothesis that natural rents, as in the case of oil, and rents induced by lack of product market competition foster corruption, is examined. A model is set up connecting rents to corruption.
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