Skip to content

Price, Authority, And Trust: From Ideal Types To Plural Forms

Jeffrey L. Bradach, Robert G. Eccles

Annual Review of Sociology · 1989 · 2,320 citations

No retraction on record in OpenAlex.Check Crossref now

Cite this paper

Bradach, J. L., & Eccles, R. G. (1989). Price, authority, and trust: From ideal types to plural forms. Annual Review of Sociology, 15(1), 97–118. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.15.080189.000525

In text: (Bradach & Eccles, 1989)

Ask a question about this research

One question, free, no account. Anchorcite finds the papers, checks each against Crossref and links every sentence of the answer to the passage it comes from.

Abstract

This review article focuses on the three control mechanisms that govern economic transactions between actors: price, authority, and trust. In contrast to conventional approaches that view market and hierarchy as mutually exclusive control mechanisms (or as poles of a continuum), we argue that price, authority, and trust are independent and can be combined in a variety of ways. For instance, price and authority are often played off each other within firms, while trust and price are sometimes intertwined to control transactions between firms. We also identify a type of organization largely ignored in the literature: the plural form. In the plural form, organizations simultaneously operate distinct control mechanisms for the same function. For example, organizations operate franchises and company-owned units under the same trademark, and companies sometimes make and buy the same part. To understand this form, the analytic focus must move from individual transactions to the broader architecture of control mechanisms

  1. Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony1977
  2. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness1985
  3. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital1988
  4. The Nature of the Firm1937
  5. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance1991

Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0). Citations are generated from the published record.