Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2000 · 2,224 citationsOpen access
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Cite this paper
B, U. G., & Rustichini, A. (2000). Pay enough or Don’t pay at all*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3), 791–810. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554917
In text: (B & Rustichini, 2000)
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Abstract
Economists usually assume that monetary incentives improve performance, and psychologists claim that the opposite may happen. We present and discuss a set of experiments designed to test these contrasting claims. We found that the effect of monetary compensation on performance was not monotonic. In the treatments in which money was offered, a larger amount yielded a higher performance. However, offering money did not always produce an improvement: subjects who were offered monetary incentives performed more poorly than those who were offered no compensation. Several possible interpretations of the results are discussed.
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