Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Edward J. Green, Robert H. Porter
Econometrica · 1984 · 1,980 citationsOpen access
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Cite this paper
Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984). Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information. Econometrica, 52(1), 87. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911462
In text: (Green & Porter, 1984)
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Abstract
Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joints profits. This paper studies the applicability of that work to empirical industrial organization. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.
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