Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements
Jeremy I. Bulow, John D Geanakoplos, Paul D. Klemperer
Journal of Political Economy · 1985 · 2,492 citations
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Cite this paper
Bulow, J. I., Geanakoplos, J. D., & Klemperer, P. D. (1985). Multimarket oligopoly: Strategic substitutes and complements. Journal of Political Economy, 93(3), 488–511. https://doi.org/10.1086/261312
In text: (Bulow et al., 1985)
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Abstract
A firm’s actions in one market can change competitors’ strategies in a second market by affecting its own marginal costs in that other mar-ket. Whether the action provides costs or benefits in the second market depends on (a) whether it increases or decreases marginal costs in the second market and (b) whether competitors’ products are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. The latter distinction is determined by whether more “aggressive” play (e.g., lower price or higher quantity) by one firm in a market lowers or raises compet-ing firms’ marginal profitabilities in that market. Many recent results in oligopoly theory can be most easily understood in terms of strategic substitutes and complements.
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