Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas
John Michael Carey, Matthew Søberg Shugart
Electoral Studies · 1995 · 2,695 citationsOpen access
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Carey, J. M., & Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. Electoral Studies, 14(4), 417–439. https://doi.org/10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2
In text: (Carey & Shugart, 1995)
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Abstract
Seat allocation formulas affect candidates' incentives to campaign on a personal rather than party reputation. Variables that enhance personal vote-seeking include: (1) lack of party leadership control over access to and rank on ballots, (2) degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of co-partisans, and (3) whether voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. District magnitude has the unusual feature that, as it increases, the value of a personal reputation rises if the electoral formula itself fosters personal vote-seeking, but falls if the electoral formula fosters party reputation-seeking.
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