Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
Douglas M Gale, Martin Hellwig
The Review of Economic Studies · 1985 · 1,778 citations
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Gale, D. M., & Hellwig, M. (1985). Incentive-compatible debt contracts: The one-period problem. The Review of Economic Studies, 52(4), 647. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297737
In text: (Gale & Hellwig, 1985)
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Abstract
In a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information we show that the optimal, incentive-compatible debt contract is the standard debt contract. The second-best level of investment never exceeds the first-best and is strictly less when there is a positive probability of costly bankruptcy. We also compare the second-best with the results of interest-rate-taking behaviour and consider the effects of risk aversion. Finally we provide conditions under which increasing the borrower's initial net wealth must reduce total investment in the venture.
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