Skip to content

Financial Contagion

Franklin Allen, Douglas M Gale

Journal of Political Economy · 2000 · 3,437 citations

No retraction on record in OpenAlex.Check Crossref now

Cite this paper

Allen, F., & Gale, D. M. (2000). Financial contagion. Journal of Political Economy, 108(1), 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1086/262109

In text: (Allen & Gale, 2000)

Ask a question about this research

One question, free, no account. Anchorcite finds the papers, checks each against Crossref and links every sentence of the answer to the passage it comes from.

Abstract

Financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. Because liquidity preference shocks are imperfectly correlated across regions, banks hold interregional claims on other banks to provide insurance against liquidity preference shocks. When there is no aggregate uncertainty, the first‐best allocation of risk sharing can be achieved. However, this arrangement is financially fragile. A small liquidity preference shock in one region can spread by contagion throughout the economy. The possibility of contagion depends strongly on the completeness of the structure of interregional claims. Complete claims structures are shown to be more robust than incomplete structures.

  1. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism1986
  2. Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity1983
  3. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers1996
  4. Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring1984
  5. The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data1994

Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0). Citations are generated from the published record.