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Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity

Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter

The Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2000 · 3,463 citationsOpen access

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Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 159–182. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.14.3.159

In text: (Fehr & Gächter, 2000)

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Abstract

This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances the possibilities of collective action greatly. Reciprocity may render the provision of explicit incentive inefficient because the incentives may crowd out voluntary co-operation. It strongly limits the effects of competition in markets with incomplete contracts and gives rise to noncompetitive wage differences. Finally, reciprocity it is also a strong force contributing to the existence of incomplete contracts.

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