Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice
Physical review. E, Statistical physics, plasmas, fluids, and related interdisciplinary topics · 1998 · 1,664 citationsOpen access
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Cite this paper
Szabó, G., & Tőke, C. (1998). Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice. Physical Review. E, Statistical Physics, Plasmas, Fluids, and Related Interdisciplinary Topics, 58(1), 69–73. https://doi.org/10.1103/physreve.58.69
In text: (Szabó & Tőke, 1998)
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Abstract
A simplified prisoner's game is studied on a square lattice when the players interacting with their neighbors can follow two strategies: to cooperate $(C)$ or to defect $(D)$ unconditionally. The players updated in random sequence have a chance to adopt one of the neighboring strategies with a probability depending on the payoff difference. Using Monte Carlo simulations and dynamical cluster techniques, we study the density $c$ of cooperators in the stationary state. This system exhibits a continuous transition between the two absorbing states when varying the value of temptation to defect. In the limits $\stackrel{\ensuremath{\rightarrow}}{c}0$ and 1 we have observed critical transitions belonging to the universality class of directed percolation.
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