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Competition in two-sided markets

Mark Armstrong

The RAND Journal of Economics · 2006 · 3,447 citationsOpen access

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Armstrong, M. (2006). Competition in two-sided markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), 668–691. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x

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Abstract

Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via “platforms,“ where one group's benefit from joining a platform depends on the size of the other group that joins the platform. I present three models of such markets: a monopoly platform; a model of competing platforms where agents join a single platform; and a model of “competitive bottlenecks” where one group joins all platforms. The determinants of equilibrium prices are (i) the magnitude of the cross-group externalities, (ii) whether fees are levied on a lump-sum or per-transaction basis, and (iii) whether agents join one platform or several platforms.

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