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An Economic Theory of Alliances

Mancur Olson, Richard Zeckhauser

The Review of Economics and Statistics · 1966 · 1,494 citations

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Olson, M., & Zeckhauser, R. (1966). An economic theory of alliances. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 48(3), 266. https://doi.org/10.2307/1927082

In text: (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966)

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Abstract

The report presents a new theoretical model of military alliances and other international organizations. The assumptions basic to the model are that nations act in their own best interests and that there is a 'public goods' aspect to all joint undertakings. The main conclusions drawn from the analysis are that (1) a less than optimal amount of resources will be devoted to an alliance or other international organization; (2) the burden of an alliance will be borne in a disproportional way, the larger members paying more than their proportional share. Empirical data from NATO and the United Nations are presented in support of these conclusions.

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