Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions
Robert Axelrod, Robert O. Keohane
World Politics · 1985 · 1,488 citations
No retraction on record in OpenAlex.Check Crossref now
Cite this paper
Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. O. (1985). Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions. World Politics, 38(1), 226–254. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010357
In text: (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985)
Ask a question about this research
One question, free, no account. Anchorcite finds the papers, checks each against Crossref and links every sentence of the answer to the passage it comes from.
Abstract
Cooperation and discord in world politics are explained to a considerable extent by the three factors discussed in the Introduction: mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and the number of players. Yet the context of interaction, perceptions, and strategies is also important. Issues are linked to one another through multilevel games, which may be compatible or incompatible. Whether reciprocity constitutes an effective strategy depends both on linkages among issues and on the institutions within which negotiations take place. Perceptions are always significant and often decisive. Decision makers often actively seek to change the contexts within which they act by linking issues, trying to alter others' perceptions, establishing institutions, and promoting new norms. This finding suggests the importance of linking the upward-looking theory of strategy with the downward-looking theory of regimes.
Related papers
- Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics2000
- International Norm Dynamics and Political Change1998
- Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination1992
- Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games1988
- Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses2005
Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0). Citations are generated from the published record.